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Introduction
The perception of own actions is affected by both visual information and predic-
tions derived from internal forward models [1]. The integration of these informa-
tion sources depends critically on whether visual consequences are associated with
one’s own action (sense of agency) or with changes in the external world unrelated
to the action [2, 3] and the accuracy of integrated signals [4, 5]. The attribution of
percepts to consequences of own actions should thus depend on the consistency
between internally predicted and actual visual signals.
Goal of this work is to develop quantitative theories for the influence of the sense
of agency on the fusion of perceptual signals and predictions derived from internal
forward models. Our work exploits graphical models as central theoretical frame-
work.
Experiment
In order to study the attribution of sensations to consequences of own actions, we
investigated the effect of the consistency between internally predicted and actual
sensory consequences using a virtual reality setup. Participants were seated in
front of a horizontal board on which their right hand was placed with the tip of the
index finger positioned on a haptic marker, representing the starting point for each
trial. Participants were instructed to execute straight, fast (quasi-ballistic) pointing
movements of fixed amplitude to a circle, which was briefly flashed before the
execution of the pointing movements. The target points on the circle could be
chosen freely by the participant within the upper right quadrant of the circle. No
explicit visual target was presented, and the hand was obstructed from the view
of the participants. Visual feedback about the direction for the peripheral part of
the movement was provided by a cursor that moved radially towards the circle.
The movement of the cursor was computed online from the hand movements of
the participants, adding rotations within the plane of the board.
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Fig. 1) Experimental paradigm and relevant variables.
The true movement of the fingertip in the plane was captured by an ultrasound
tracking system. Visual feedback (cursor movement) was either veridical, or ro-
tated against the true direction of the hand movement by predefined angles (i.e.
±5◦, ±10◦, ±20◦, ±40◦). These offset angles were randomized over the whole ex-
periment in order to minimize the effects of trial-by-trial adaptation. After each
trial participants were asked to report the subjectively experienced direction of
the executed hand movement Xe by placing a mouse-cursor into that direction.
Figure 1) shows an example: The true motor act is pointing in a direction that de-
viates from the subjectively experienced motion direction (indicated in gray). The
visual feedback (indicated in black) deviates from the true motion direction by a
predefined offset (order randomized over trials).
Graphical Model
We compared two probabilistic models: Both include a binary random gating vari-
able (agency) that models the sense of ’agency’; that is the belief that the visual
feedback is influenced by the subject’s own motor action. The first model, (Fig. 2),
assumes that both the visual feedback Xv and the internal motor state estimate Xe
are directly caused by the (unobserved) intended motor state Xt, where µt is the
true motor action as measured by the tracking system. The second model assumes
instead that the expected visual feedback Xv depends on the perceived direction
of the own motor action Xe (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 2) Model 1. Fig. 3) Model 2.
The variables representing internal forward models and proprioceptive feedback
are not shown in the graphical models, as no quantifiable statements about them
can be derived from our experimental paradigm. Therefore, these variables are
treated as unobserved and their effects are subsumed by the statistics of the in-
ternal motor state variable Xe. From the subject’s perspective the only observed
variables are µt, via proprioception, and Xv . The parameters that need to be esti-
mated are the prior statistics for each variable, e.g. for model 1:
Xt ∼ N
(
Xt|µt, σ2t
)
; Xe ∼ N
(
Xe|Xt, σ2e
)
; Xv|agency=self ∼ N
(
Xv|Xt, σ2v
)
(1)
Xv|agency=other ∼ N
(
Xv|µ0, σ20
)
; agency ∼ Bernoulli (agency|Pself) (2)
In the graphical model, all parameters but µt are located outside the plate, signify-
ing their constancy over trials, while the variables inside the plate change for each
trial.
Parameter Estimation (1)
Maximum Likelihood
In order to learn the parameters Θ = {Pself, σ2e , σ2v , σ2t , σ20 , µ0} it is necessary to max-
imize the likelihood of the (independent) measurements X(i)e over all N trials,
arg max
Θ
N∏
i
p
(
X(i)e |X(i)v , µ(i)t ,Θ
)
. (3)
For improved computational performance, maximizing the log-likelihood is com-
mon practice. Optimization was based on an active set method (MATLAB Opti-
mization Toolbox). To avoid local minima, the algorithm was started with 10,000
randomly sampled parameter configurations, selecting the best optimum over this
sample. The marginal probability in (3) is a sum over agency, conditioned on
{X(i)v , µ(i)t ,Θ}. For sake of readability, the conditioning on {µ(i)t ,Θ} and the su-
perscript (i) are omitted.
p (Xe|Xv) =
∑
agency
p (Xe, agency|Xv) (4)
The summands in (4) can be calculated by marginalizing Xt out of the joint prob-
ability and conditioning on Xv by dividing by the marginal probability p(Xv),
giving
p (Xe, agency|Xv) =
∫
dXt p (Xt, Xe, Xv, agency)∑
agency
∫
dXe
∫
dXt p (Xt, Xe, Xv, agency)
. (5)
Parameter Estimation (2)
Only equations for model 1 are shown here, as the derivations for model 2 are similar. The joint probability of (5) can be calculated by exploiting the factorization
described by the graphical model, giving
p
(
X
(i)
t , X
(i)
e , X
(i)
v , agency
(i)|µ(i)t ,Θ
)
= p
(
X
(i)
t
)
p
(
X(i)e |X(i)t
)
p
(
X(i)v |X(i)t , agency(i)
)
p
(
agency(i)
)
. (6)
With the probability distributions in eqs. (1) and (2) and eqs. (3) through (6), the parameters were estimated using the above described maximum likelihood optimization
criteria. Results of representative subjects are given below.
Bayesian Learning
Instead of just computing point estimates via maximum likelihood, estimation of the complete parameter posterior distribution will allow us to determine whether the
parameters are well-constrained by the data, or whether more data need to be recorded. Parameter estimation using Bayesian learning cannot be solved analytically
anymore. One approximation approach is the optimization of the variational bound (Gibbs free energy, [6]), L, commonly done by EM steps to alternately optimize for
the variational posterior q(agency) and the posterior hyperparameters (α, β, κ, λ). Within the exponential family conjugate prior framework in [6], priors conjugate to the
parameter probability distributions can be defined:
Pself ∼ Beta
(
Pself|as, bs
)
, σ2t ∼ Γ-1
(
σ2t |at, bt
)
, σ2e ∼ Γ-1
(
σ2e |ae, be
)
, σ2v ∼ Γ-1
(
σ2v |av, bv
)
, µ0, σ
2
0 ∼ N -Γ-1
(
µ0, σ
2
0 |l0, k0, a0, b0
)
(7)
The lower bound L for variational inference can be calculated with (7) from (6) using Jensen’s inequality and the Kullback-Leibler divergence, giving
L =
∫
dX
(1)
t . . .
∫
dX
(N)
t
∑
agency(1)
· · ·
∑
agency(N)
N∏
i=1
[
q
(
agency(i)
)
q
(
X
(i)
t
)
q (Θ)
] N∑
i=1
ln p
(
X
(i)
e , X
(i)
t , X
(i)
v , agency(i)
)
q
(
X
(i)
t
)
q
(
agency(i)
) + ln p (Θ)q (Θ)
 . (8)
This bound can be computed using the joint probability from (6) and the conjugate priors from (7). Given that solution, calculating the update equations for the variational
posterior q(agency) and the posterior hyperparameters (α, β, κ, λ) gives all necessary equations for the variational EM algorithm.
Computation of Agency Posterior
From a psychological viewpoint, it is interesting to investigate the posterior distribution of agency, specifically p(agency=self|Xv), as it describes the probability that the
subject interprets the visual stimulus as having been caused by the subject’s own actions. Applying the sum and product rules of probability, we find
p
(
agency(i)=self|X(i)v , µ(i)t ,Θ
)
=
Pselfσ0 exp
(
− 1
2(σ2t+σ
2
v)
(
X
(i)
v − µ(i)t
)2)
(
1− Pself
)√
σ2t + σ
2
v exp
(
− 1
2σ20
(
X
(i)
v − µ0
)2)
+ Pselfσ0 exp
(
− 1
2(σ2t+σ
2
v)
(
X
(i)
v − µ(i)t
)2) (9)
Results (1)
10 healthy subjects participated in the experiment. The parameters Θ were esti-
mated using maximum likelihood optimization. To compare the assumption of a
common set of parameters for subjects and the assumption of individual parame-
ters for each subject, parameter estimation was performed both on the joint dataset
over all subjects, as well as on individual subject’s data.
All Subjects Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4
Model 1 6347.32 566.21 645.14 608.69 530.76
Model 2 6362.88 571.43 646.27 611.72 532.49
Table 1) Negative of maximized log-likelihoods.
Table 1) shows the negative of the maximized log-likelihood for all participants
and single representative subjects. Both models accurately predict the data (Table
1), showing that small deviations between predicted and actual visual information
were attributed to one’s own action. This was not the case for large deviations,
where subjects relied more on internal information.
Presented below are the results of representative subjects. The upper row holds
the predictions of model 1 for the subjectively experienced sensory consequences
of the subjects’ motor actions. In the bottom row are the posteriors of agency attri-
bution of the sensory feedback to oneself as predicted by model 1.
A clear distinction between the subjects’ predicted agency posteriors can be seen
in Figures 4) - 7).
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Fig. 4) Subject 1. Fig. 5) Subject 2. Fig. 6) Subject 3. Fig. 7) Subject 4.
Results (2)
Fig. 4) shows a narrow agency posterior, signifying a sensitivity to deviations
between internally predicted and actual sensory consequences. This is also evident
in the difference between reported subjectively experienced sensory consequence
and true motor action being a flat curve with a very small linear portion, i.e. the
subjectively experienced sensory consequence were influenced more strongly by
the internal motor state estimate than by the visual feedback.
Fig. 6) shows a wide agency posterior, on the other hand, implying a less
stringent attribution of agency of sensory consequences to one’s own actions. A
stronger influence of the visual feedback on the subjectively experienced sensory
consequence is visible in a more pronounced linear part, compared to Subject 1.
Subject 2’s agency posterior lies between those of Subject 1 and 3 (Fig. 5)).
Fig. 7) shows a case where the subject attributed agency of the visual feedback
as sensory consequences to own motor actions, even for large deviations between
visual feedback and true motor actions. This signifies a very low influence of the
internal estimates, i.e. the proprioceptive measurements and the predictions by the
internal forward models, on the subjectively experienced sensory consequences of
one’s actions compared to the visual stimuli.
Discussion and Conclusion
Subjectively Experienced Consequence. The tendency to attribute observed vi-
sual consequences to one’s own action varied from subject to subject. For small
deviations between real and predicted visual consequences of the own action, in-
ternal state estimate and visual feedback were integrated in a way that was similar
to a linear cue fusion model (e.g. [7]). For large deviations, participants’ subjective
direction estimates were largely independent from the visual feedback.
Attribution of Agency. Consistent with this observation, we found a systematic
variation of the posterior distributions of the agency variable with the size of the
deviation: small deviations resulting in high probability, and large deviations re-
sulting in low probability of attribution of agency for sensory consequences of mo-
tor actions to one’s own actions. Subjects showed individually-specific tendencies
(priors) for the attibution of agency and different regimes of deviations between
predicted and actual visual feedback that resulted in linear fusion and the attribu-
tion of the visual stimulus to consequences of the own action.
Schizophrenia Patients. In some cases we found even for all conditions an attri-
bution of agency to oneself as the cause of perceived sensory input. A similar ef-
fect was reported in adaptation experiments with schizophrenia patients [8], who,
compared to healthy controls, showed a tendency to attribute perceived visual
stimuli more to consequences of their own actions than to external influences.
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